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This paper analyses the role of economists in advising political agents. Based on the experience in the recent
financial crisis, it starts with the important role of expectations management. Economists should make clear that
precise forecasts are not possible but that application of economic principles and careful analysis of data and
historical events can substantially improve political decisions. In order to be effective, economic advisors have to be
aware of the first best as well as of the political feasibility of proposals. Efficiency is the obvious benchmark, but a
large part of policy advice is about finding the least inefficient of the feasible alternatives. The paper argues that a
crucial precondition for being an effective policy advisor are communication skills; academics who become policy
advisors should not try to impress their peers but rather translate insights in a language that is understandable for
educated laypeople. The paper then looks at the special situation of economic policy advice in the Swiss direct
democracy before concluding with a summary of the most important preconditions for being a successful policy
advisor.Introduction
“Why did no one see it coming?” Queen Elizabeth II asked
her embarrassed hosts when hearing about the effects of
the global financial crisis that had recently broken out
during a visit at the London School of Economics in
November 2008. This frequently cited question summa-
rises one possible interpretation of economists’ role in
policy consulting: When the crisis struck, neither did
economists have a useful forecast to offer nor could their
models assess the effects of this financial earthquake on
the global economy. However, there is a second diametric-
ally opposed interpretation of the same event. Economists
analysed the penultimate global financial crisis—the Great
Depression of the 1930s—in such a thorough manner that
they were able to tell politicians which economic policy
measures had to be taken in order to prevent a recurrence
of such a crisis next time. In fact, the combination of
extraordinary monetary policy measures, support of banks
and fiscal reactions probably prevented the outbreak of a
second great depression in 2008. This economic policy
reaction was largely rooted in the scientific analysis of the
failures in policy advice and measures taken in the 1930s.Correspondence: aymo.brunetti@vwi.unibe.ch
Department of Economics and Center for Regional Economic Development
(CRED), University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article
International License (http://creativecommons.o
reproduction in any medium, provided you giv
the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifThis paper is organised as follows: The “Expectations
vs. deliverables” section argues how important expecta-
tions management is for economic policy advisors. The
“Efficiency vs. feasibility: goals of economists’ policy
advice” section discusses the goals of economists’ policy
advice, and the “Communication is crucial” section is on
the crucial importance role of communication for
successful policy advice. The “Economic policy advising
in Switzerland” section turns to the specific situation for
policy advisors in Switzerland with its direct-democratic
political system, and the “Concluding remarks” section
concludes.
Expectations vs. deliverables
The introductory example shows the importance of
having realistic expectations what economic advice is
capable to deliver, and what not. Our science has fre-
quently been criticised for being unable to make precise
forecasts. However, this demand, also frequently made
by many politicians, is far too ambitious. Economic life
is too complex, there are too many influencing factors
and measurability is too incomplete to expect reliable
quantitative forecasts of macroeconomic events. This is
not only true for forecasts but is also valid for quantitative
evaluations on the effects of economic policy decisions. In
my opinion, anyone working in the field of economicis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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demands for precise forecasts; sometimes this works,
sometimes not. To give a positive example: expectation
management concerning quantitative forecasts has been
successfully conducted only recently in an important eco-
nomic policy decision in Switzerland. When at the begin-
ning of the financial crisis in 2008 it became necessary to
design economic policy reactions, it was easy to commu-
nicate in the face of the extraordinary shock that a precise
economic forecast as a basis was not feasible. This insight
facilitated the breakthrough of a sensible plan of action.
Right from the start a step-by-step procedure for the
implementation of fiscal stabilisation measures was
chosen. Decisions on each step took into account the
latest economic data and therefore depended on con-
tinually adjusted economic expectations. Thus, at the
outset, it was deliberately decided not to base the
whole programme on a supposedly precise quantitative
forecast.1 In this specific situation, it was possible to ex-
plain the infeasibility of such an approach to policymakers,
who naturally would have preferred a precise forecast. In
less extraordinary cases, this, unfortunately, regularly
proves to be much more difficult.
If quantitative forecasts are not possible with sufficient
precision, what kind of analysis can economics contribute
to economic policy consulting? In my opinion, there are
essentially three feasible forms of deliverable input for pol-
icy advice. First—often underestimated—economists can
get some mileage by contributing simple and measurable
facts to the policy debate. Political exponents, who pro-
claim the end of jobs every time new technology emerges,
can for example easily be confronted with the simple fact
that employment in Switzerland has continually risen in
the last century—despite immense technological progress.
Secondly, basic economic concepts can be helpful in
convincingly explaining the consequences of economic
policy measures. Simple supply and demand curve ana-
lysis suffices to show that a minimum wage, which is sig-
nificantly higher than the equilibrium wage will reduce
employment. And thirdly, economic history provides a
wealth of material through which one can learn from the
results of past economic policy measures. The introduc-
tory example of the analysis of economic policy and its
shortcomings during the Great Depression impressively
demonstrates the immediate value of such ex-post evalua-
tions. It is certainly possible, therefore, to expect reliable
estimates on the qualitative effects of economic policy
measures from economics.Efficiency vs. feasibility: goals of economists’
policy advice
We now turn to the question of what economists aim
for when advising policymakers.Economists are mainly specialists on the allocation of
scarce resources. In advising policymakers their most im-
portant role, therefore, is to bring the aspect of efficiency
into the political discussion.2 In an ideal (and rather rare)
case, policymakers ask economic advisors how to design
policies in order to maximise welfare, i.e. the sum of con-
sumer and producer rents. In this situation, economists
will use traditional microeconomic theory and push for
market solutions as long as no market failures distort
allocative efficiency. In case of clear market failures (i.e.
monopolistic power, externalities, public goods and some
forms of information asymmetries), economists can—a-
gain based on established concepts—suggest the most
efficient measures to deal with them. However, much
more frequent is the situation where politicians have
already decided to intervene on an issue due to non-
efficiency goals and the task of the economic advisor
is to suggest on the best way to proceed. In this situ-
ation, it is not the first best that economists can aim
for but rather the least inefficient way to reach the
politically defined goal.
In this context, a crucial question emerges for any
economist who chooses to leave pure academic work and
give policy advice: How should politics be taken into ac-
count? Should the economist always insist on propagating
the most efficient solutions independently of their feasibil-
ity? Or should they limit themselves to the politically
achievable? From my point of view, both approaches have
their merits and which is selected primarily depends on
the institutional role the respective economist assumes.
Should the economist be an external observer who com-
ments on economic policy issues as a scientist, it is helpful
to state clearly by which approach scarce resources can
most efficiently be used without worrying too much about
politics. Such statements can serve as general guidelines
for the economic policy debate. However, if economists
limited themselves to such statements, it would be easy
to dismiss their recommendations as purely academic.
As soon as economists are more involved institution-
ally, they also have to consider other options than the
first best solution. In such cases—as already alluded
to—the politically achievable possibilities are to be ana-
lysed choosing the one, which results in the lowest pos-
sible degree of inefficiency. In this role as a scientific
collaborator or a chief economist of an administration,
the main task is to point out economic costs and bene-
fits and—if necessary—propose alternatives. The chal-
lenge is to signalise that one is aware of political
realities without losing sight of economic efficiency.
The added value of economists in a public administra-
tion is to point out the economically most efficient
solution among the politically achievable possibilities
without seeming politically naïve and not to assume the
role of a political advisor (others can do so better).
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(2013) seems too ambitious. They argue that advisors
should not only consider and propagate the most efficient
solution but they should also take into account the effect
of suggested policies for future political equilibria. If for
example an efficiency-enhancing policy weakens labour
unions, this could, in the future, lead to a political equilib-
rium that inefficiently favours business interests. In my
view, this can be an interesting approach for understand-
ing the development of institutions ex post. But suggesting
that policy advisors should ex ante try to consider possible
effects on future political equilibria is too ambitious. It has
the disadvantage of asking for too much from economic
advisors and in addition has the flavour of economist
trying to outsmart politicians. Promising too much and
then not delivering is a recipe for weakening the influence
of economic policy advisors.Communication is crucial
Making understandable statements is the most important
prerequisite for effective economic policy consulting on
all levels. Even the best economic analyses lose their value
if politicians do not understand them. Hence, a large part
of consulting economists’ work is translating academic
findings into everyday language. The challenge for highly
specialised economists hereby is translating economic in-
sights, frequently based on technical academic research,
into statements, a non-specialist can understand. And this
is best achieved by working with simple basic models and
a lot of examples—as it is done in good introductory eco-
nomic textbooks. Indeed, I believe it is no coincidence
that of the last nine chief economists of the US govern-
ment (Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisors
of the President), six have written introductory textbooks
in economics; see Table 1.3
Although these are in most cases highly renowned aca-
demic researchers, they were so aware of the great value
of clearly explained economic basics that they devoted
substantial time and effort to writing such textbooks.Table 1 CEA heads of Bush II and Obama administrations as
textbook authors
Jason Furman None
Alan Krueger Explorations in Economics
Austan Goolsbee Microeconomics
Christina Romer None
Edward Lazear None
Ben Bernanke Macroeconomics; Principles of Economics
Harvey Rosen Microeconomics
Gregory Mankiw Principles of Economics; Macroeconomics
Glenn Hubbard Essentials of EconomicsAvoiding complicated reasoning is crucial, but policy ad-
visors should at the same time be differentiated enough in
their explanations and avoid populist over-simplification.
In my experience, a policy advisor who usually explains in
an understandable manner gains enough credibility from
the policymaker to be listened to if he occasionally offers
necessary differentiation.4
The so-called Growth Report, which was written as a
basis for federal growth policy in the past decade, in my
view is a good example in Swiss economic policy of the
added value, a (permitted) simplification can provide.5 A
glance at the literature shows that growth theory is an
exceptionally technical area of economics. And even the
use of its most basic models for the explanation of
growth policy would not have been digestible for non-
specialists. But it is easy to understand that growth can
only come from two sources, namely additional hours
worked, on the one hand, and additional production
per hour worked (= labour productivity), on the other
hand. From this simple insight, the decisive conclusion
can be drawn that Switzerland—contrary to most EU
countries—has already strongly exploited its labour po-
tential and, therefore, additional sustainable growth has
to be achieved by increasing productivity. This simple idea
was the story the whole growth report was subsequently
based on and it proved to be an easily communicable
concept in debates with policymakers.
Economic policy advising in Switzerland
Switzerland has quite a unique political system. The
most distinguishing feature is its direct-democratic insti-
tutions that strongly shape policymaking in this country.
The right to start an initiative for a constitutional change
brings frequent votes on far-reaching proposals from
outside parliament. However, even more important for
the mechanics of how politics works in Switzerland is
the referendum. Each proposed change of law can be
brought to a public vote by collecting 50,000 signatures,
which is quite a small number given the more than 5 mil-
lion people with a right to vote. This institution has led to
a strong process of finding political compromises, that are
not challenged by referenda.6 One important consequence
is that Switzerland since more than half a century is gov-
erned by a coalition government that includes all four
largest political parties. There is no prime minister and
elections do not lead to changes in government—the op-
position plays a minor role without ever having the possi-
bility to lead (or even be a member of) the government.
And this peculiar system resulting from direct-democratic
institutions not only is relevant for the federal level but
also for all cantons.
This system very much shapes the role of policy advisors
in Switzerland. First and most obviously, due to the fre-
quent votes on specific issues (initiatives and referenda), the
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much more important role than in purely representative
systems. Therefore in this country, public statements by
academic economists on economic policy issues potentially
have a markedly more direct influence than in systems
where the population elects a broad policy platform once
every 4 years. And, because this applies at all federal levels,
it is especially worthwhile for economists outside the ad-
ministration to publicly express their opinion on topics
relevant to economic policy. Secondly, the fact that there
are seven ministries with no prime minister means that
majorities have to be found within the administration on all
issues. Economic advisors have to be convincing for their
colleagues in other ministries in promoting economic argu-
ments in policymaking. Historically, the major economic
competences had been split up within the finance and the
economics ministries. With the creation of the State
Secretariat for Economic Affairs in the last decade, the
economists of the economics ministry have been concen-
trated in one directorate. Since then, this economic policy
directorate has assembled a critical mass of economists
who now serve as analysts of the economic aspects of all
major policies. However, given the need for consensus,
these economists can only be effective when construct-
ively and intensively collaborating with the economists of
the other ministries. In promoting the government’s
growth strategy or in dealing with the policy response to
the financial crisis, this collaboration recently proved to be
quite effective.
Beyond administration, the economists of business asso-
ciations and labour unions are particularly influential in
Switzerland. This is rooted in the fact that these organisa-
tions can always convincingly threaten to fight new legisla-
tion by organising a referendum. Government therefore
has a strong incentive, to listen to the opinion of these
interest groups in shaping legislative proposals. This is
done informally by consulting them in the preparation of
policies and more formally in the very far-reaching con-
sultation process (the so-called Vernehmlassung) before
the government sends a proposal to parliament. Com-
pared to countries with no direct democracies, economic
advisors, however, tend to play a smaller role in political
parties and in think tanks.
Concluding remarks
At the beginning of the 1960s, James Tobin shortly
served as member of the Council of Economic Advi-
sors for the Kennedy administration. After this assign-
ment ended, in Tobin (1966), he wrote a short piece
on advices for economic policy advisors. The following
summarises his main points:
 Take the standpoint of the economy as a whole
 Look for ultimate effects, not only at immediate ones Worry about silent consumers, not only loud
producers
 Examine the mutual consistencies of diverse policies
 Use statistics and history, but handle them with care
 Challenge assumptions that are taken for granted
 Seek alternative solutions with less inefficiencies
In my view, this is still an insightful summary of what is
essential to be an effective advisor on economic policy
issues.7
As I spent almost 20 years in different roles as eco-
nomic advisor for the Swiss government, let me add to
this by summarising in three points what I found to be
particularly important in the context of economic policy
advice in Switzerland:
Firstly and above all, economists in economic policy
consulting act as advocates for the price mechanism. For
non-specialists—and hence for most politicians—it is not
apparent that a market economy is most efficiently guided
by relative prices and not by detailed regulation. We econ-
omists have internalised Adam Smith’s invisible hand to a
degree that we tend to forget that this brilliant insight is
not intuitively evident. Politicians, who want to solve a
problem, instinctively prefer organisational and legally
verifiable regulation. One of the most central tasks of con-
sulting economists is to point out, as convincingly as pos-
sible, alternative ways to achieve goals far more efficiently
via undistorted relative prices and market mechanisms in-
stead of detailed planning.
Secondly, and connected, I believe that it is very im-
portant for economic advisors to stress the option of
“doing nothing”. In the event of economic problems,
politicians have a very pronounced tendency to resort to
economic policy “actionism”. Quite understandably, they
want to be seen taking measures actively. However, if
there is no obvious market failure, the most efficient
course of action is to do without interventions; doing
something then only creates distortions and causes un-
necessary uncertainty. Economics ministers who do not
always attract attention with new activities do their job
especially well in most cases. And, because they will usu-
ally be criticised for this approach, it is the economists’
task to provide valid arguments for and to publicly defend
efficient doing nothing.
And thirdly, echoing a point also stressed in Tobin’s
list, in consulting, economists are responsible that all the
economic effects of possible measures are taken into
account and not only the most evident ones. Political
analyses very often focus on especially influential and
well organised groups. However, it is imperative that the
impacts on poorly organised (e.g. consumers) or not orga-
nised groups (e.g. next generation) are made transparent
by economic analyses. Ideally, economists represent the
economy as a whole within politics.
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nomic arguments to be actively introduced into public de-
bate and the once-in-a-century event in the financial
sector has probably led to a strengthening of economic
policy consulting in the past years. Although we econo-
mists could not fulfil the Queen’s somewhat unrealistic
expectations for a prediction of such a crisis, the relatively
successful economic policy reactions based on careful
analyses of previous crises have demonstrated the benefits
of qualified economic policy consulting.
Endnotes
1See Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (2012) for a more
detailed description.
2For elaborations on this position, see, e.g. Schultze
(1982) or Behn (1981).
3The references are: Krueger & Anderson (2013)
Goolsbee et al. (2016), Abel et al. (2008), Frank et al.
(2015), Morgan et al. (2009), Mankiw (2015), Mankiw
(2017), Hubbard & O’Brian (2012)
4The tightrope walk for economic policy advisors in
communicating with policymakers are well summarised
by the following two well-known statements attributed
to Albert Einstein: “If you can’t explain it simply, you
don’t understand it well enough” and “Everything should
be made as simple as possible, but not simpler”
5See Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (2002).
6See Neidhardt (1970).
7Other interesting overviews on the major roles of econ-
omists in policy making include Ackley (1966), Rivlin
(1987), Leman and Nelson (1981) or Hamilton (1992).
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